










































Do Nothing 'Till You Hear From Me: Language and Perception
Citation for published version:
Webber, B 1995, Do Nothing 'Till You Hear From Me: Language and Perception. in I Horswill & M Walker
(eds), Embodied Language and Action: Papers from the AAAI Fall Symposium. AAAI Press, AAAI 1995 Fall
Symposia, Cambridge, MA, United Kingdom, 10/11/95.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Published In:
Embodied Language and Action
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
\Do Nothing Till You Hear from Me":
Composing Processes with Termination Conditions
Bonnie Webber






Embodied agents act in a world and derive perceptions
from it. One thing that perceiving the world enables
such an agent to do is decide when s/he can stop what
s/he is doing and get on to something else.
In terms of Natural Language (NL) instructions
that specify action, the termination condition an agent
is meant to be checking for may be derivable from
the verb and its arguments (a.k.a. \logical form" or
\predicate-argument structure"), as in
(1) Close the door.
) The agent can stop moving the door when s/he
has seen/heard/felt it is closed.
(1) Put the books in the freezer.
) The agent can stop picking up book(s) and plac-
ing them in the freezer when s/he sees they are all
inside.
Often in NL instructions, however, the termination
condition an agent must check for can only be derived
from some clausal adjunct, as in the case of instruc-
tions containing \until" clauses:
(Do)  until 
These instruct an agent to engage in the process speci-
ed by  (where a process is an action with no intrinsic
termination condition), terminating  when the condi-
tion specied by  is determined to hold. Perception
is critical to that determination. For example,
(1) Lay the rst brick on the mortar bed. Press it
down until the mortar is about 3/8 inch thick.
This requires the agent to monitor the amount of mor-
tar underneath the brick she's pressing down, stop-
ping both pressing and monitoring only when she de-
termines that only 3/8 inch of mortar remains under
the brick.

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(This does not exhaust the source of termination
conditions in NL instructions. As we show in (0), spec-
ifying the purpose of some action may indirectly convey
the conditions for terminating it (i.e., when that pur-
pose is achieved). The termination condition for an
action can also be conveyed directly or indirectly in a
separate sentence { e.g., \Saute the onions over a low
ame. When they have wilted, add the chopped gar-
lic." Specifying the additional discourse-level machin-
ery needed to handle such examples is quite beyond
the scope of this short paper.)
A group of faculty and students associated with
Penn's Center for Human Modeling and Simulation is
exploring the use of Natural Language and other high-
level task specications to create realistic animated
simulations of virtual human agents carrying out tasks.
The value in using a high-level task specication is that
the same specication can be used to produce appro-
priate agent behavior in a variety of dierent environ-
ments and/or dierent conditions, without additional
animator or programmer intervention. Such simula-
tions can thus aord a relatively inexpensive way to
carry out human factors studies in computer-aided de-
sign, multi-agent training, or even studies of Natural
Language understanding.
Using NL instructions to guide the behavior of an-
imated agents requires parsing and mapping instruc-
tions to a logical form, and then mapping that struc-
ture into a representation that can drive the behav-
ioral simulation that forms the basis for animation.
While instructions with \until" clauses present no ma-
jor problem for parsing, mapping them to a represen-
tation that will produce realistic behavior requires un-
derstanding the behavioral contributions of both  and
 and how they are commonly integrated. That is, a
realistic rendition of \(Do)  until  is not simply a
matter of doing  for some time until  becomes true:
separate actions needed to asses  may have to be in-
terleaved at appropriate points during the performance
of , which may in turn depend on the relationship be-
tween  and . My point here is that composing a pro-
cess with a termination condition requires reasoning.
My hope here is to elucidate some of that reasoning.
The data on which this paper is based are drawn
from six chapters of two volumes of home repair in-
structions scanned in by Joseph Rosenzweig, a gradu-
ate student at the University of Pennsylvania: Dorling
Kindersley's Home Repair Encyclopedia (0) and the
Reader's Digest New Complete Do-It-Yourself Manual
(0). The data consist of 80 instructions containing \un-
til clauses", which provide clear examples of activities
contingent on monitored conditions.
Some of the instructions concern repair jobs (e.g.
xing broken china, repairing cracked parquet, etc.),
and the others concern construction of concrete, as-
phalt, and/or masonry structures. (The chapters were
chosen randomly, not because of their subject matter,
and all sentences containing \until" clauses were ex-
tracted from them.) While these instructions do not
come from face-to-face engagements, and while there
are well-known dierences between written and spo-
ken language, I believe they do reect agents' physical
presence in on-going activities and an awareness of the
perceptual stimuli that should be available to them. I
would therefore claim that these instructions represent
suggestive evidence of language facilitating extended
agent interaction with the world, which is the subject
of the workshop.
The agent architecture I am assuming contains at
the very least:
 one or more low-level Sense-Control-Act (S-C-A)
loops, that can be invoked, modied and/or killed
by
 a process-based (as opposed to state-space) control
structure (cf. (0)). The one we have begun to
use in much of our animated simulation work is
called a parallel transition network (PaT-Net) (0;
0). Nodes in a PaT-Net correspond to processes.
Arc transitions occur when (1) a particular broad-
cast signal is received; (2) a specic feature of the
environment is found to have a particular value
when polled; or (3) an instrinsic culmination point
is reached.
With respect to such an architecture, instructions with
\until" clauses would be interpreted as process-based
representational structures that set the S-C-A loops
and interpret both their success and error conditions.
's Contribution to Agent Behavior
The rst thing to note is that perception alone may
be insucient to determine whether a condition holds:
one or more actions may rst be necessary to bring the
world into a state in which an appropriate observation
can be made. Such actions Kirsh and Maglio (0) have
called epistemic.
1
While no epistemic action may be
required in
1
Kirsh and Maglio use the term pragmatic action for
ones whose purpose is to bring an agent closer to her goal.
(2) Squeeze riveter handles until rivet stem breaks
o.
to be able to observe the rivet stem breaking o, to
determine whether condition  holds in
(3) Wait for the ller to set and rub it down, rst with
a needle le and then with glasspaper, until it lies
ush with the surface.
the agent must use some form of tactile perception.
This will likely force her to stop rubbing the ller with
glasspaper and feel the ller-surface area with her n-
gertip(s).
Where the agent is assumed to know how to detect
, no explicit guidance is given. Where the agent is
not assumed to know how to detect , she may be told
how to do so, in terms of relevant epistemic actions
and directly preceivable condition. For example, the
water-changing instructions below provide guidance in
determining whether water contains salt.
(4) Change the water daily until all the salts have
gone. To test this, hold a spoonful of the water over
a ame so that the water evaporates. There should
be no salts left.
One reason for providing explicit guidance is that the
epistemic and perceptual actions can have undesirable
side eects. To avoid them, an alternative procedure
may be specied in the instructions, although perhaps
not necessarily in the clearest way { e.g.
(5) Leave this glaze for a short time until it becomes
\tacky" (a test strip on an old tile will indicate when
it is ready).
In the end though, it is possible that the specied con-
dition cannot be directly perceived and that no proce-
dure for determining it is provided { e.g.
(6) Mix the powders a little at a time until the pro-
portions look right, : : : .
The agent is then left to her own devices.
An interesting case is where the condition to be
tested for is the agent's ability to perform the next
action in the sequence. While the condition may be
tested several times and found not to hold, when it
is found to hold, the next action has eectively been
performed { e.g.
(7) Chip brick with chisel until it can be removed.
(8) After loosening stone with pick and shovel, pry it
out with one 2x4, then with the other, until you can
use one of the levers as a ramp to get stone out of
hole.
There may, of course, be several ways to assess a
condition, and with further experience, an agent may
change which one she uses. So in the earlier brick-
laying example (repeated here)
(9) Press it down until the mortar is about 3/8 inch
thick.
an inexperienced agent may have to interrupt her
pressing to measure with a ruler the amount of the
mortar still remaining beneath the brick. With expe-
rience, the agent may learn to simply eyeball thick-
ness. In creating realistic animations, we can have our
agents' skills reect any degree of experience, as long
as it is clear what they are supposed to represent.
's Contribution to Agent Behavior
As noted earlier, in instructions of the form (Do)  un-
til , must be interpretable as a process in Moens and
Steedman's terminology (0) { that is, a temporally-
extended action with no intrinsic culmination point.
If  cannot be directly interpreted as a process, it
must be coerced into such an interpretation. Moens
and Steedman, for example, note how \for phrases"
such as \for ve minutes", can coerce what they term
an culminated process { i.e., a temporally-extended ac-
tion with a culmination point { into a process either
through iteration of the basic action or through loss of
its intrinsic culmination, as in:
(10) Play the Moonlight Sonata for 1 minute.
(11) Play the Moonlight Sonata for 1 day.
In the rst case, the intrinsic culmination point is lost
(one stops after a minute, not when one reaches the
end of the piece), and in the second, playing the sonata
must be repeated until it lls the whole day.
The rst thing to note in interpreting instructions
with \until" clauses, is that coercions such as the above
can help to determine what the agent is supposed to
be doing and what its relationship is to the condition
to be assessed. In the most straightforward case,  is
the process that aects the world either cumulatively
until  is the case
(12) Squeeze riveter handles until rivet stem breaks
o.
or nondeterministically until  is the case
(13) Try sample specks on the piece until you get a
get a good match, wiping them away each time until
you nd the right colour.
As the condition-eecting process,  may either be a
simple process such as in the \squeeze" example above
or in
(14) Rotate the plate until the guide ngers touch
the rod lightly
or what Moens and Steedman call an iterated process
(15) Strike set with fat end of hammer until rivet
head is rounded o.
(16) Fill in low spots and strike o again until con-
crete is level with the top of the form.
On the other hand, when it is an independent pro-
cess that aects the world either cumulatively or non-
deterministically, the agent may not be responsible for
doing anything other than actions needed to assess the
specied condition .
(17) Let poultice stand until it dries.
(18) Stop work and wait until the water evaporates
and the concrete stiens slightly.
The independent process that produces the speci-
ed condition is usually one that has been initiated by
a previous action taken by the agent. If the process
is cumulative, the condition to be assessed may either
be its end stage, as in example 17, or an intermedi-
ate stage, as in example 18, where the process must
be interrupted, lest the concrete harden completely. (I
speculate that this independent process could be non-
deterministic, but I do not have any examples as evi-
dence.)
An independent process may also be involved in pro-
ducing the specied condition when the agent is herself
engaged in a non-wait process { e.g.,
(19) Place the article in a plastic container and add
distilled water : : : . Change the water daily until all
the salts have gone.
(20) Heat larger pieces rst with a broad ame, oth-
erwise they may distort. Heat the joint in the centre
until it is red hot.
The existence of an independent process can also af-
fect what will happen if the agent stops her non-wait
process { say to check whether the condition holds.
In example 19, the agent's action of changing the
water enables the process of drawing salt out of the
article to continue. If the amount of salt in the water
and on the surface of the article are in equilibrium, the
process will stop on its own accord. Thus, if the agent
fails to act, the specied condition \all the salts have
gone" will never be achieved. The agent's action pro-
vides, in a sense, the resources needed for the process
to continue.
In example 20, on the other hand, the agent is not
providing additional resources through her action but
rather maintaining the existing situation, which in
turns enables the heating process to continue. If the
agent stops her maintenance action { e.g., to check
whether the center joint is red hot { the joint will start
to cool.
I noted above two forms of coercion from an activity
with a culmination point to the process against which
an \until" clause can be interpreted. I noted such coer-
cions help to determine what the agent is meant to be
doing. Here I want to suggest a third type of coercion.
While I pose it as an alternative to the analysis given
by Moens and Steedman in (0), it adheres to their basic
event ontology and thus provides additional evidence
for it. The suggestion is motivated by the following
example:
(21) If solder gets runny or if iron smokes, turn o
iron until it cools a bit.
I think it is obvious that what the agent is meant to
do is to turn the soldering iron o (at which point it
will start to cool) and then wait some amount of time
until the iron is cooler and has stopped smoking. The
question is what that interpretation derives from.
2
Turning o an appliance is a culmination in Moens
and Steedman's terminology, an activity that gives rise
to a change in the world but that a speaker views as
happening instantaneously. Moens and Steedman note
that a \for" adverbial (which, like an \until" clause,
requires a process) in combination with a culmination
seems to denote a time period following the culmina-
tion. For example
(22) John left the room for a few minutes.
But they deny that such a durative interpretation is
correct, claiming that the phrase expresses intention
rather than duration, since the following utterance
would be true even if John is only out of the room
for an instance:
(23) John left the room for a half hour, but returned
immediately to get his umbrella.
I do not believe that the \until" clause in Exam-
ple 21 has this property. Consider the related sentence
(24) John turned o the microphone until his hiccups
disappeared.
One cannot deny the inference that the microphone
stayed o for the full period until John's hiccups
disappeared.
3
For a reading of intention, a modal
would be needed:
(25) John turned o the microphone until his hiccups
would disappear, but he had to turn it on again im-
mediately to get the audience's attention.
I would argue then that the coercion that seems to be
the case { that the process in question is a coercion
of the consequent state that takes hold at the culmina-
tion point of \turn o" and continues until the agent
intervenes { is actually the case. I believe that such
a coercion is only possible if the culmination initiates
an independent process, but this needs additional evi-
dence to either support or deny.
There is one more point I want to make about how
an agent derives the action she is meant to carry out,
given an instruction of the form
2
I thank Joseph Rosenzweig for suggesting the following
analysis.
3
It is a separate issue whether the microphone is turned
back on afterwards, but one very relevant to instruction-
following. It appears that what a agent is meant to do
after a condition holds is strongly inuenced by purpose
and/or common expectations:
i. Slow down until you are out of the school zone.
() You can then speed up.)
ii. Slow down until you see my house.
() You should then stop.)
iii. Slow down until you reach the end of the cul-de-sac.
() You can then turn around.)
(Do)  until .
That is that being told what condition  to check can
also convey information as to how one is must act in
order to check it. As such, perceptual conditions can
function just like purpose clauses (0; 0; 0; 0) in guiding
an agent to the action she is intended to carry out as
well as conveying what perceivable condition should
lead her to stop it. The following two examples have
led me to that conclusion:
(26) Have your helper move the tape side ways until
the 4-foot mark on the tape coincides with the 5-foot
mark on the rule.
(27) To make sure that all corners are square, meaure
diagonals AD and BC, and move stake D until the
diagonals are equal.
Without the \until" clause , the \move" verb phrases
above are underspecied: they do not tell the agent
(or her helper) what direction to move in. The \un-
til" clauses, by indicating the condition to be achieved,
conveys direction by implication { whatever direction
will most directly lead to the condition becoming true.
Integrating Behaviors from  and 
To create a realistic animated simulation, one needs
to gure out how the behaviors motivated by  and 
should be integrated. There are two interesting points
about this issue:
 Since all actions require resources, the agent must
determine whether the behaviors motivated by  and
 can be carried out in parallel, or whether they must
be interleaved.
 Even if they can be carried out in parallel, check-
ing a condition has a cost and often undesirable side
eects as well, so the agent may prefer to do it as
little as possible, without preventing her pragmatic
actions from coming to a successful conclusion. This
means recognizing when to start checking for the
specied condition and how often to do so.
The impression I get from the instructions I have
looked at so far is that lexical semantics can only con-
tribute to the solution of the rst problem, in terms of
what can be derived from aspectual type and aspec-
tual coercion. For example, when a culminated process
is coerced to a process through iteration of the basic
action, the perceptual condition can be checked at the
end of each iteration, as in:
(28) Strike set with fat end of hammer until rivet
head is rounded o.
(29) Fill in low spots and strike o again until con-
crete is level with the top of the form.
On the other hand, I do think the instructions them-
selves help suggest answers to the questions of when to
start checking for the specied condition and how often
to do so. Here I am returning to the notions of cumu-
lative eects and non-deterministic eects I introduced
earlier. First consider a condition that results cumu-
latively from an on-going process. If the cumulative
eect is perceivable, then based on the expected rate
of the process, an agent can delay checking the con-
dition until the point that the eect is likely to take
hold. For example, in
(30) Chip brick with chisel until it can be removed.
it is not worth the agent's eort to start checking
her ability to remove the brick each time she's dis-
lodged another chip. If the cumulative eect is not
perceivable, then it is as if the condition were a non-
deterministic result of the process. In the case of con-
ditions that arise non-deterministically, then the ex-
istence of a reliable probabilistic model of the pro-
cess might be incorporated into an ecient perceptual
strategy.
4
The examples so far only address the cost of check-
ing conditions and therefore the desirability of a policy
that delays them as long as possible and does them as
infrequently as possible. I also want to call attention to
the danger of starting to check a cumulative condition
too soon, a danger that can be avoided by delaying
checking:
(31) Let cement dry until kraft paper won't stick to
either surface.
Checking too soon can result in kraft paper stuck to
the surface.
Conclusion
Questions about language and perception cannot be
investigated outside the context of embodied agents.
Animated simulation can provide us with embodied
simulated human agents that allow us to better under-
stand language, and by doing so, allow us to better
employ such agents for our benet.
References
Badler, N., Webber, B., Becket, W., Douville, B.,
Geib, C., Moore, M., Pelachaud, C., Reich, B., Stone,
M. Planning for Animation. To appear in N. Maginet-
Thalmann and D. Thalmann (eds.), Computer Ani-
mation, Englewood Clis, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Becket, W. The Jack Lisp api. Technical Report
MS-CIS-94-01/Graphics Lab 59, University of Penn-
sylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6389, 1994.
Di Eugenio, B. Understanding Natural Language In-
structions: a Computational Approach to Purpose
Clauses. PhD Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, De-
cember 1993. (Technical Report MS-CIS-93-93.)
Di Eugenio, B. Action Representation for Interpreting
Purpose Clauses in Natural Language Instructions.
Proc. 4th Int'l Conference on Principles of Knowl-
edge Representation and Reasoning (KR '94), Bonn
Germany, May 1994.
4
This suggestion is due to Joseph Rosenzweig.
Di Eugenio, B. and Webber, B. Plan Recognition in
Understanding Instructions. Proc. 1st. Int'l Confer-
ence on Articial Intelligence Planning Systems, Col-
lege Park MD, June 1992.
Di Eugenio, B. and Webber, B. Pragmatic Overload-
ing in Natural Language Instructions. Submitted to
Int'l J. of Expert Systems.
Kirsh, D. and Maglio, P. On Distinguishing Epistemic
from Pragmatic Actions. Cognitive Science 18(4),
1994, pp. 513-549.
McGowan, J. and DuBern, R. (eds.) Home Repair.
London: Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 1991.
Moens, M. and Steedman, M. Temporal Ontology
and Temporal Reference. Computational Linguistics,
14(2):15-28, 1988.
Pym, D., Pryor, L. and Murphy, D. Actions as Pro-
cesses: A position on planning. Working Notes, AAAI
Spring Symposium on Extending Theories of Action.
Stanford CA, March 1995, pp. 169-173.
Reader's Digest New Complete Do-It-Yourself Man-
ual. Pleasantville NY: The Reader's Digest Associa-
tion, 1991.
